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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL 
1. Judge Rigtrup erred in the or ig inal Divorce Decree in f a i l i ng to 
g r a n t a l imony t o t h e P l a i n t i f f , w i f e of t h e D e f e n d a n t . 
2. Judge Rigtrup erred in not granting a new t r i a l in the divorce 
proceeding between Plaintiff and Defendant or in the alternative amending the 
Judgment and altering the Decree of Divorce in conformity with the provisions 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a) and 59(e) in l i g h t of the 
Appeallant's demonstration of the disproportionate division of asse t s a t the 
time of the hearing on the Motion for the new t r i a l or a l t e rna t ive ly the 
Motion to amend the existing Judgment and Decree of Divorce. The Appellant 
argues this error was a clear abuse of discretion and tha t the evidence was 
insuff ic ient to support the Judgment and Decree en te red by the Court . 
3. Judge Rigtrup erred in f a i l ing to grant a new t r i a l because the 
Defendant had not had her day in Court alleging f i r s t a physical incapacity 
ie a hearing loss which prevented her from understanding the nature of the 
proceedings involved in the judicial process a t the time set for the t r i a l on 
the merits and secondly, in tha t default was entered in a summary form of 
proceeding as a r e su l t of proffer of evidence and s t ipu la t ion which was 
subsequently disputed by the Affidavit of the P l a i n t i f f and where the 
Affidavit of Plaintiff disputed the foundation for t h i s summary proceeding, 
the summary proceeding as a Motion for Summary Judgment requires the Court to 
view the evidence in a l ight most favorable to the Plaintiff evidencing tha t 
no genuine issue of material fac t ex i s t s in order to be sustained by the 
C o u r t . T h e A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s , w a s n o t t h e c a s e . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 19th day of March 1985
 r before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup f 
District Judge in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, 
State of Utah, the case of Joan H. Elton v. Curt is Beck Elton came on for 
t r i a l . Joan Elton was present with her attorney E.H. Fankhauser and Curt is 
Beck E l t o n was p r e s e n t w i t h h i s a t t o r n e y B . L . D a r t * 
Evidence was submitted by s t ipu la t ion read in to the record by the 
part ies. The Court thereafter accepted the s t i pu l a t i on of the p a r t i e s as 
read into the record, took testimony concerning grounds and j u r i s d i c t i o n and 
authorized the entry of a Decree of Divorcer Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in conformity wi th the s t i p u l a t i o n and t h e t e s t i m o n y . 
A Decree of Divorce was signed by Judge Rigtrup and f i l ed in Tooele 
County Court Clerk's office on the 16th day of April 1985. A motion for a 
new t r i a l or in the alternative a motion to amend the judgment in conformity 
with the provisions of Rule 59(a) and 59(e) of the Utah Rules of C i v i l 
Procedure was filed timely with the Court and on the 20th day of May 1985 a 
hearing was held on Pla int i f f ' s motion as stated, before the Honorable Judge 
Rigtrup resulting in an Order subsequently signed by Judge Rigtrup denying 
both motions. Fran th is Order and frcm the Order in the form of the ex is t ing 
Decree of Divorce this appeal i s taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Summary of the Arguments e s s e n t i a l l y in t h i s case i s t h a t the 
Appellant suggests tha t f i r s t Judge Rigtrup was in error in not granting 
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alimony to the P la in t i f f . The P la in t i f f has a s ign i f ican t hearing loss 
requiring the use of a mechanical hearing aid and finding i t impossible to 
hear without the same. The Judge had a duty to prevent the P la in t i f f from 
becoming a public charge and in allowing the P la in t i f f to l i ve as nearly as 
possible a t the standard of l iv ing she enjoyed during the course of the 
marriage which duty he fa i led to f u l f i l l by f a i l i n g t o g ran t al imony. 
Secondlyf the Appellant suggests that Judge Rigtrup erred in failing to grant 
a new t r i a l because of the A p p e l l a n t ' s c l e a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n of a 
disproportionate division of assets per the existing Decree of Divorce. The 
Appellant asserts this to be a clear abuse of discretion and asserts tha t the 
evidence i s insufficient to support the d i s t r i bu t ion of asse t s in the form 
and format provided by the Decree of Divorce. The Appellant asserts tha t the 
demonstration of this disproportionate division of assets occurred c lea r ly a t 
the time of the hearing on the Appellant's Motion for a New Tria l or in the 
alternative a Motion to amend the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Thirdly, 
the Appellant argues that the nature of this divorce proceeding was a summary 
proceeding and that in a summary proceeding there can be no foundation to 
uphold judgment on a summary proceeding where there i s evidence of a dispute 
as to a material fact or an issue of material fact l e f t unresolved between 
the p a r t i e s . The Decree having been founded upon proffers and an o r a l 
stipulation read into the record i s subject to attack by the presentat ion in 
a timely fashion of evidence of a disputed material fact which presentat ion 
was properly made to Judge Rigtrup. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT ALIMONY 
TO THE PLAINTIFF WIFE 
In the case of Grainme v. Gramme. 587 P2d 144 (Utah, 1978) , at page 147 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah said: 
"The purpose of alimony is to provide post marital 
support; it is intended neither as a penalty imposed 
on the husband nor as a reward granted to the wife. 
Its function is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from 
becoming a public charge. Important criteria in 
determing a reasonable award for support and maintenance 
are the financial conditions and needs of the wife, 
considering her station in life; her ability to produce 
sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the 
husband to provide support." 
In our case at bar the Appellant, as is affirmed in her sworn Affidavit 
submitted with her Motion for a New Trial, wears a hearing aid as a result of 
a severe hearing deficiency. The Appellant in this Affidavit avers an 
incapacity to hear without this hearing aid and further makes the averment 
that she did not have to wear a hearing aid before she was physically abused 
during the course of her marriage by her husband and has since that time 
needed the assistance of this mechanical device in order to hear. The 
evidence before the Court showed a substantial capacity for income production 
on the part of the Defendant husband and a very limited capacity for income 
production on the part of the Plaintiff wife. Further these affirmations as 
indicated herein and in the Affidavit of the Plaintiff would show or tend to 
establish a cause or one of the potential causes for this disproportionate 
earning capacity and for a genuine risk evident of the Plaintiff ultimately 
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becoming a public charge and failing to maintain herself in a financial 
position consumate with that position maintained during the course of her 
marriage. In fact no evidence exists to the contrary. No evidence exists 
that would give rise to any presumption that the Plaintiff wifef in this case 
Appellant before this Court, will have any ability to sustain herself as 
nearly as possible to the standard of living which she enjoyed during the 
course of the marriage. 
With these arguments having been presented to Judge Rigtrup in the 
Motion for a New Trial and the Motion alternatively to Amend the Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce particularly with the allegation of a reduced earning 
capacity predicated upon the physical abuse of the wife by the husband during 
the course of the marriage, equity would demand a review of the question of 
an entitlement to alimony above and beyond the Plaintiff1 s legal right to 
acquire the same. This concept was not persuasive to Judge Rigtrup and the 
Appellant respectfully submits that this was a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the Court and an error at law. 
POINT II 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY JUDGE RIGTRUP 
IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE IN LIGHT OF THE 
APPELLANT'S DEMONSTRATION OF A DISPROPORTIONATE 
DIVISION OF ASSETS 
In the case of English v. English , 565 P2d 409 (Utah 1977) at Page 
410 the Court says: 
"The Trial Court in a divorce actionf has considerable 
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and 
property interest. A party appealing therefrom has 
the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding or 
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misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial 
and prejudical error; or the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion." 
This case has resulted in just such a serious inequity as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. The evidence submitted by Affidavit and proffered 
to the Court in the hearing held on the 20th day of May 1985 before the 
Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup evidences a gross disparity in the division 
of the marital estate. Without reciting the nature of that gross disparity 
calling to the Court's attention the language of the Affidavit supporting the 
Motion for a New Trial and the language contained on pages 2 through 8 of the 
transcript of the hearing of May 20, 985, evidences just such inappropriate 
and grossly disproportionate division of assets. Where such evidence was 
presented to the Court in a timely fashion a proper procedural review 
process and where such evidence was as clearly demonstrable, it was an error 
at law for Judge Rigtrup to fail to grant a new hearing on the merits or for 
purposes of amending the existing judgment or simply granting a new trial. 
The nature of equity would require that basically the marital estate be 
divided equally between the parties as is the traditional route undertaken by 
the trial courts in this state and sustained by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah. As the English case evidences considerable latitude and 
discretion is allowed but grossly disproportionate divisions of the marital 
estate are not envisioned within this latitude. The facts allege a four to 
one and three to one ratio in favor of the Defendant/Respondent in the 
division of the marital estate. Allegations of that kind of disproportionate 
division are so great that the Court should be charged with the responsibility 
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of investigating by law and by equity. 'That investigation properly would take 
the step of a hearing on the merits in the form of either a new trial or a 
hearing to determine a more appropriate distribution in the form of an Amended 
Judgment and Decree. 
POINT III 
A DEFAULT DIVORCE HEARING ATTAINS THE 
SUBSTANTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF A SUMMARY 
PROCEEDING AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS AND 
JUDGMENTS RENDERED IN SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 
REQUIRE NO ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT LEFT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
To sustain a Motion for Summary Judgment which is in essence what this 
Court will be asked to do by the Respondent on appeal, the pleadings, 
evidencef admissions and inferences should be most favorably reviewed from 
the point of view of the party opposing the entry of the Summary Judgment or 
the sustaining review of the Summary Judgment and must show that there is no 
issue of material fact. See C. Frederick May and Company v. Dunn , 368 
P2d 266 (Utah 1962) and Bowen v. Riverton City , 656 P2d 434 (Utah 1982) • 
Argumentatively even with a stipulation read into the record by the 
parties and agreed to by the parties before the Judge without the 
introduction of demonstrative evidence ie. testimony and documentary evidence 
the Court is in essence engaged in the rendering of a Summary Judgment from 
what essentially amounts to proffers by the parties and/or their counsel. 
For the protection of the rights of the parties where within a timely fashion 
particularly within the time provided for in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the filing of a Motion for a New Trial, one or more of the 
parties represents evidence as in the form of a sworn affidavit of the 
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existance of an outstanding issue of material fact the Court cannot sus ta in , 
grant or endorse the Summary Judgment. That i s exact ly what took place in 
th is case. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly remarked in i t s decisions 
in the past that the existance of issues of material f ac t w i l l preclude the 
entry of a Summary Judgment and even though we a r e a n a l o g i z i n g t h e 
traditional conduct of a Motion for Summary Judgment in a law and motion 
setting to the summary disposition of a case in defaul t divorce s e t t i ng the 
analogy i s well formed. This c l ient , the Appellant herein has not had her 
day in Court and the Decree and Findings have been based upon, again what 
essentially amounts to proffers, representations, and not upon demonstrative 
e v i d e n c e or q u a n t i t a t i v e a m o u n t s of s w o r n t e s t i m o n y . 
The Appellant submits tha t error has occurred in the lower Court by 
their failure to grant a new t r i a l or an amendment t o the ex i s t ing Judgment 
and Decree because substantive and material issues of fact have been raised 
concerning the case between the parties and these i ssues were ra ised timely 
and procedurally in a proper format. Further, the Appellant respect fu l ly 
submits t h a t the Supreme Court should accept the analogy of the Summary 
Judgment proceeding to the summary disposi t ion of the divorce proceeding 
because of the equitable considerations required for the benefi t of the 
parties in a divorce proceeding where the nature of the issue of a mater ia l 
fact pertains to a disproportionate division of the mari ta l e s t a t e between 
the l i t igan t s . 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has not been given a fair day i n Court a s s e r t i n g i n her 
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Affidavit that she could not hear on the date that her attorney and she 
appeared before Judge Rigtrup together with Mr. Dart and his client Mr. 
Elton. The Appellant has not been given her day in Court because of the 
nature of the summary disposition and the lack of demonstrative evidence 
involving this case. The Appellant has been given a grossly inadequate and 
disproportionate division of assets in the case and has not been given 
alimony to any degree even in light of her physical limitations and the 
disproportionate earning capacities. The Appellant has availed herself the 
appropriate procedural steps for the review by the lower Court and has failed 
to gain an open ear. The Appellant respectfully submits that this case is 
pregnant with inequities and errors of law and requires a remander to the 
trial Court with a direction for a new trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of November, 1985. 
likh IQA^-AA 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true, correct and complete 
copy of the document to which this certificate is appended or included was 
hand delivered to the hereinafter designated addressee on the 27th day of 
November, 1985: 
B.L. Dart 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant• 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 84-347 
Consolidated with 
Civil No. 84-348 
Judge Rigtrup 
This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the 
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 1985, the 
Honorable Kenneth •• Rigtrup, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff 
was present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H. 
Fankhauser. Defendant was present in person and represented by 
his attorney, Bert L. Dart. The parties, through their respective 
attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all of the matters 
in the above entitled action; and which stipulation was acknowledged, 
accepted and approved by the parties hereto, and which stipulation 
was approved by the Court and ordered to be included in the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce herein; 
and, the default of Defendant having been duly entered by the 
Court to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the Plaintiff having 
been duly sworn and testified in support of the allegations of 
her Complaint on file herein; and more than ninety (90) days 
having lapsed since the commencement of this action; and the 
matter having been submitted to the Court for its determination 
and decision; and the Court, having made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and in accordance therewith, now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That Plaintiff, JOAN ELTON, be and is hereby granted 
a Decree of Divorce from Defendant, CURTIS BECK ELTON, dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony presently existing between Plaintiff and 
Defendant, which Decree of Divorce is to become final upon entry. 
2. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property, free and clear of all claims of Defendant, 
the following, to-wit: 
(a) The home and residence owned by Plaintiff 
before marriage located at 28 0 Marvista, Tooele, Utah 
subject to the balance of the mortgage indebtedness 
thereon which he is to assume and pay; 
(b) All furniture, household furnishings, appliances 
and effects in her possession, except for the items 
specifically awarded to Defendant; 
(c) 1969 Corvette owned before marriage; 1981 
Toyota pickup truck, subject to the balance of the 
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obligation owing thereon to Tooele Federal Credit Union 
which she is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless; 
(d) Ten (10) shares American Western Insurance 
stock owned before marriage; 118 shares Pacific Gas and 
Electric stock (100 shares preferred, 18 shares common); 
(e) All bank accounts in Plaintiff's name, including 
Plaintiff's IRA account. Defendant's IRA account with 
Tooele Federal Credit Union. Defendant is ordered to 
change over his IRA account to the name of Plaintiff; 
(f) $10,000.00 representing Plaintiff's share of the 
equity in and to the tri-plex property, which sum is to 
be paid out at the rate of $300.00 per month commencing 
on or before April 15, 1985 and the 15th day of each and 
every month thereafter with interest at the rate of ten 
(10%) per annum until paid in full. Plaintiff is to have 
a first mortgage lien on the tri-plex to secure payment 
of this amount; 
(g) All building materials in Plaintiff's possession, 
together her personal property, clothing, jewelry and effects. 
3. Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property, free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff, the 
following, to-wit: 
(a) The tri-plex located at 261 Marvista, Tooele, 
Utah, subject to any and all indebtedness and encumbrances 
thereon which he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless and subject to a mortgage lien in favor of 
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Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000,00 payable at the 
rate of $300.00 per month commencing on or before the 
15th day of April, 1985 and the 15th day of each and 
every month thereafter until paid in full, together with 
interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum; 
(b) The Scotch Futures owned by Defendant before 
marriage; all proceeds from the sale of the Jonathan Logan 
stock; together with Defendant's bank accounts in his 
name, except for Defendant's IRA account with Tooele Federal 
Credit Union, which account and all sums on deposit therein 
is to be awarded to Plaintiff. Defendant is to arrange 
for transfer of the IRA account to the name of Plaintiff; 
(c) 1978 Toyota Landcruiser, one-third (1/3) interest 
in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with camper, subject 
to the balance of the indebtedness owing thereon which 
Defendant is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless; the 198 5 Chevrolet Van, subject to the indebted-
ness owing thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay 
and hold Plaintiff harmless; one-half (1/2) interest in 
the boat, motor and trailer, the Honda motorcycle with 
trailer, the one-third (1/3) interest in the 1953 Willy's 
Jeep; 1976 Vega owned before marriage; 
(d) The items of furniture, furnishings and appliances 
in possession of Defendant, together with the furniture 
received from his mother consisting of a couch, love seat, 
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bedroom set, washer and dryer; 
(e) Defendant's retirement account with the 
United States Government, Department of the Army; 
(f) The residence recently purchased located at 
291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah; 
(g) Defendant's tools, including his table saw 
and drill press and his own personal property, clothing, 
jewelry and effects. 
4. Each of the parties are awarded two of the lots located 
at Gold Hill Townsite, Tooele County, Utah. Plaintiff is to have 
thirty (30) days from the date of the entry of this Decree of 
Divorce to elect which lots she desires to be awarded to her. 
Should Plaintiff fail to elect which lots she desires to be 
awarded to her, Plaintiff will be awarded Lots 18 and 26, Block D, 
Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah; 
and Defendant will be awarded Lots 17 and 27, Block C, Gold Hill 
Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the balance 
of the mortgage indebtedness owing on her home, the balance of 
the loan obligation owing on the 1981 Toyota pickup truck, Sears, 
Wards, J.C. Penneys and any obligations and debts she has incurred 
since commencing this action and hold Defendant harmless. 
6. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and 
obligations owing on the tri-plex, GMAC on the 198 5 Chevrolet Van, 
GMAC on the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck, the obligation owing to 
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First Interstate Visa card, First Interstate Mastercard, his 
personal loans to First Security Bank and Tooele Federal Credit 
Union and all other debts and obligations he has incurred since 
commencement of this action and hold Plaintiff harmless, 
-jjC 7. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
8. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum 
of $750.00 for theuse and benefit of her attorney to assist her 
in the payment of her attorney1s fees and costs. Each party shall 
be responsible to pay the balance, if any, on their own attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in this action. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to execute any and 
all documents necessary to carry out the awards of property as 
set forth herein. 
DATED this day of April, 198 5. 
BY T: 
ETH ft RIGT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: ,• 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 84-347 
Consolidated with 
Civil No. 84-348 
Judge Rigtrup 
This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the above 
entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 1985, before the 
Honorable Kenneth •. Rigtrup, District Judge. Plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H. Fankhauser. 
Defendant was present in person and represented by his attorney, 
Bert L. Dart. The Court held an informal Pre-trial conference 
with counsel in chambers; and the parties thereafter, through their 
respective attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all 
of the matters in the above entitled cause of action, which stip-
ulation was read into the record, and acknowledged, accepted and 
approved by the parties hereto, and each of them and their respective 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant. 
counsel; and, the Defendant having stipulated that his Complaint 
(Civil No* 84-348) consolidated with this action and deemed to 
be an Answer and Counterclaim, may be withdrawn and his default 
entered to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the default of Defendant 
having been duly entered by the Court; and the stipulation and 
settlement agreement of the parties having been approved by the 
Court; and the Plaintiff having been sworn and testified in 
support of the allegations of her Complaint on file herein; and 
more than ninety (90) days having lapsed since the commencement 
of this action; and the matter having been submitted to the 
Court for its determination and decision; and the Court, being 
fully advised in the premises, does now make and adopt the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is a resident of Tooele County, State 
of Utah and has been for more than three (3) months prior to the 
commencement of this action• 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married December 28, 1977 
at Las Vegas, Nevada. 
3. That no children have been born as issue of the marriage 
between Plaintiff and Defendant and none are expected. 
4. During the marriage relationship Defendant treated 
Plaintiff cruelly causing her to suffer mental distress and nervous 
upsot in that the Defendant was very demanding of the Plaintiff 
and cntized her in front of family members, relatives and friends; 
exhibited a violent temper and verbally and physically abused 
the Plaintiff, all of which acts caused the Plaintiff to suffer 
extreme mental distress and nervous upset to such an extent that 
continuation of the marriage relationship became impossible. 
The parties separated on or about July 1, 1984 and have remained 
separate and apart since said date. The Court finds sufficient 
cause existing for waiving the interlocutory period. 
5. Pursuant to the stipulation entered into between the 
parties, through their respective attorneys, the Plaintiff is 
to be awarded as her sole and separate property, free and clear 
of all claims of the Defendant, the following: 
(a) All personal property owned by Plaintiff prior 
to her marriage to Defendant, including and not limited 
to, furniture, appliances, household furnishings; 1969 
Chevrolet Corvette; 10 shares of common stock in American 
Western Life; her own personal property, clothing, jewelry 
and effects; 
(b) All of the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, 
appliances, housekeeping supplies and effects in possession 
of Plaintiff, including and not limited to, microwave oven, 
dishwasher, sewing machine, two color portable television 
sets, all building materials in possession of the Plaintiff; 
her bank accounts in her name; the 1981 Toyota pickup truck, 
subject to the balance of the obligation owing thereon to 
the Tooele Federal Credit Union, which she is to assume 
and pay and hold Defendant harmless; 
(c) The home and residence in Plaintiff's name 
located at 280 Marvista, Tooele City, Utah, subject 
to the balance of the first mortgage indebtedness owing 
thereon which she is to assume and pay, free and clear 
of any and all claims of the Defendant; two (2) of the 
four (4) lots located in the Gold Hill Townsite, Westward 
Ho Addition, Tooele County, Section 1, Township 8 South, 
Range 18 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Plaintiff 
shall have thirty (30) days from the date of the Decree 
of Divorce to elect which two lots she desires to be 
deeded to her. Should the Plaintiff fail to make the 
election within thirty (30) days from the date of the 
Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff shall be awarded Lots 18 
and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition. 
Defendant will be awarded Lot 17 and 27 of Block C, Gold 
Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition. 
(d) Plaintiff is to be awarded all sums on deposit 
in Defendant's IRA Retirement account with Tooele Federal 
Credit Union, including accumulated interest. Defendant 
is to make arrangements to transfer ownership of the 
account to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is awarded all shares 
of stock presently held by the parties in Pacific Gas 
and Electric comprising 100 shares of preferred stock 
and 18 shares of common stock; 
(e) Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff as her share 
of the equity in and to the tri-plex located at 261 Marvista 
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Lane, Tooele, Utah, the sum of $10,000,00, payable 
at the rate of $300.00 per month with interest of ten (10%) 
percent per annum. Payments are to commence on or before 
April 15, 1985 and on or before the 15th day of each and 
every month thereafter until the entire sum of $10,000.00, 
together with interest at ten (10%) percent per annum is 
paid in full. Plaintiff is to have a first mortgage lien 
on the tri-plex until the entire sum of $10,000.00 is 
paid in full. 
(f) Defendant stipulates and agrees that he will 
pay to Plaintiff to assist her in the payment of her 
attorney's fees the sum of $750.00. Said sum shall be 
payable within thrity (30) days from the date of the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
6. Pursuant to the oral stipulation entered into between 
the parties, through their respective attorneys, the Defendant is 
to be awarded as his sole and separate property, free and clear 
of all claims of the Plaintiff, the following: 
(a) The property owned by Defendant before marriage 
to Plaintiff, including and not limited to, the 1976 Vega, 
the Scotch Whiskey Future, proceeds from the sale of 
Jonathan Logan stock, camping equipment, the black & white 
television set, the other items of furniture and appliances 
in his possession, and the proceeds from the sale of his 
home at 990 Coleman Avenue, Tooele, Utah, which proceeds 
were used to purchase the tri-plex at 261 Marvista Lane, 
Tooele, Utah; his own personal property, clothing, jewelry 
and effects; 
(b) Defendant's tools, table saw and drill press; 
the courch and love seat received from his mother; the 
bedroom set received from his mother; the washer and 
dryer received from his mother; the 1985 Chevrolet van, 
subject to the existing loan owing thereon which he is 
to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff harmless; the one-third 
(1/3) interest in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with 
camper, subject to the balance of the loan obligation owing 
thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay and hold 
Plaintiff harmless; the one-half (1/2) interest in the 
boat, motor and trailer; the 1978 Toyota Landcruiser; 
the one-third (1/3) interest in the Willy's Jeep; the 
750 Honda motorcycle with trailer; and his Federal 
Retirement account with the United States Government; 
(c) Defendant is to be awarded the tri-plex located 
at 261 Marvista Lane, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and 
all indebtedness and encumbrances owing thereon which 
Defendant is to assume and pay and subject to a first 
mortgage lien in favor of Plaintiff in the sum of 
$10,000,00, which lien is to be payable at the rate of 
$300.00 per month with interest at the rate of ten (10%) 
percent per annum, commencing April 15, 1985 and the 
15th day of each and every month thereafter until paid 
in full; 
(d) Two (2) of the lots located at Gold Hill 
Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, subject 
to the option of Plaintiff to elect within thrity (30) 
days which of the two lots she desires to be awarded 
to her. In the event Plaintiff should fail to make 
an election within thrity (30) days from the date of 
the Decree of Divorce, Defendant shall be awarded Lots 
17 and 27 of Block C, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho 
Addition, Tooele County, Utah. Plaintiff shall be 
awarded Lots 18 and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite, 
Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah; 
(e) Defendant is to be awarded all right, title 
and interest in and to the home recently purchased by 
him located at"291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah, subject 
to any and all indebtedness owing thereon which he is 
to assume and pay; 
(f) Defendant, by stipulation, is to be responsible 
to assume and pay the debts and obligations owing to 
GMAC for the 198 5 Chevrolet Van, GMAC for the 1978 
pickup truck and camper; First Security Bank loan for 
attorney's fees, Tooele Federal Credit Union for 
Defendant's personal loans; the Elton estate for all 
sums borrowed, Rex Elton; the Mastercard account with 
Tooele Federal Credit Union; and the Visa card account 
at Tooele Federal Credit Union, together with any and 
all other debts and obligations he has incurred since 
separation and hold Plaintiff harmless; 
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(g) Plaintiff stipulates that she will be 
responsible to assume and pay the debts and obligations 
owing to Sears, Wards, J.C. Penneys, her truck loan to 
Tooele Federal Credit Union, and all other debts and 
obligations she has incurred since separation and 
hold Defendant harmless; 
(h) Defendant is awarded his bank accounts in his 
name except for his IRA account with Tooele Federal 
Credit Union which is to be transferred to Plaintiff; 
(i) Each party stipulates and agrees that they will 
execute any and all documents necessary to carry out the 
transfers and awards of property, real and personal, 
stipulated to, and approved by the Court. 
7. Plaintiff, at the time she married Defendant, was totally 
disabled due to a loss of hearing (Tinnitus) and was receiving 
disability benefits from her former employer, Tooele Ordinance 
Depot. Plaintiff receives disability benefits at the present time 
of $659.00 per month gross. Defendant is employed and working for 
the United States Government at Dugway Proving Grounds and has a 
gross income of $30,000.00 per year. The parties stipulated that 
alimony not be awarded to either party. Under the present circum-
stances, it is reasonable that alimony not be awarded to either 
party. 
8. Plaintiff has in force and effect a hospital and medical 
insurance policy. Defendant has in force and effect through his 
employment, a hospital and medical insurance policy. It is reason-
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able that each party be required to maintain their own hospital 
and medical insurance policies for their own benefit. 
9. The Court finds that the oral stipulation entered into 
between the parties is reasonable under the present circumstances, 
does hereby approve said stipulation and finds that the same should 
be incorporated in the, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
to be entered herein. 
The Court, having made its Findings of Fact, now concludes 
as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of this matter and of the 
parties. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
the Defendant upon the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree 
is to become final upon entry. 
2. That the oral stipulation and property settlement 
agreement submitted to the Court, and duly approved by the Court, 
which stipulation and property settlement agreement is set forth 
in the Findings of Fact hereinabove, is adopted by the Court and 
is expressly incorporated in these Conclusions of Law. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded all of the real and personal 
property stipulated to be awarded to Plaintiff and as set forth 
in the Findings of Facts hereinabove . 
4. Defendant should be awarded all of the real and personal 
orr^r-y stipulated to be awarded Defendant as set forth in the 
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Findings of Fact hereinabove. 
5. Neither party should be awarded alimony. 
6. Each of the parties should be ordered to execute any 
and all documents necessary to carry out the awards of property 
stipulated to between the parties and as set forth in the Findings 
of Fact hereinabove; Further, each of the parties should be 
ordered to deliver those items of property in their possession 
awarded to the other party. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this /i day of April, 198 5. 
BY THE COURT: 
K2NNE^H 31RIGTR 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved as t o form: 
/ j - . ' (#,/' 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND PCR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
JOAN H. ELTON, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
CUKTIS BECK ELTON, ] 
Defendant. 
i MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL CR 
I JH THE ALTERNATIVE A MOTION 
i TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
) C i v i l No, 84-347 
consol idated with 84-348 
i (Judge Rigtrup) 
GOMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through her attorney of record William 
B. Parsons III and moves the above entitled Court in conformity with the 
provisions of Rule 59(a) and 59(e), for a new trial in the divorce proceeding 
between Plaintiff and Defendant or in the alternative for an amended Judgnent 
and altered Decree of Divorce, 
The Plaintiff substantiates in part the Motion for a ttew Trial on the 
provisions of Rule 59(a) (6) Otah Rules of Civil Procedure and asserts that no 
evidence was taken by formal worn testimony nor were any documents adnitted 
after a foundation was properly laid except the matter of grounds and 
jurisdiction and the general agreement as to understanding by the Plaintiff 
and that the evidence is not in any form sufficient to support the decision 
or Decree or the division of property as set forth in said Decree* The 
nature of the agreements between the parties were not because of the 
averments in Plaintiff's Affidavit sufficient to sustain the ckcis.;..:*• a:«" 
determination of the Decree and a division of the property as is ev:<< i..« r i;. 
the Decree is not supported even by the general averments, proffers and 
representations, the nature of the division being excessive in favor of the 
Defendant, prejudicial to the rights of the Plaintiff, and not in the 
interest of justice* 
Rule 59(a)(1-4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require Affidavits to 
substantiate and support them as foundations for a new trial and the 
Plaintiff has in her Affidavit asserted irregularities in the proceedings 
which prevented her fron having a fair trial, entitling her to a new trial on 
the merits* 
In the alternative, should the Court not grant a new trial, the 
Plaintiff requests an extension of time in which to supply additional 
Affidavits to evidence such a disproportionate distribution of property 
acquired during the course of the marriage in favor of the Defendant and 
against the Plaintiff's best interest as to entitle the Plaintiff to an 
amendment of the existing Judgment and Decree of Divorce. It is the 
assertion of the Plaintiff that the distribution evidenced by the existing 
Decree so disproportionately favors the Defendant as to not be reasonable* 
prudent or in the interest of justice and as to not otherwise be justified 
based upon the evidence or proffers made at the time of the original hearing* 
DATED this day of r"4fi^_"L , 1985. 
fV . & . TQ.h fin.* . ?**-
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
zJ 
MAILING CERTIFICAIE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going was mailed postage prepaid this 3 & day of AfUj ( , 1985, 
to: 
B.L. Dart 
DART, ADAMSON, PARKEN & PROCTOR 
310 South Main #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Je^i Gay Canter, Secret Secretary 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OOURT 
IN AND FCR TOOELE COUNTY, STA0E OP UTAH 
-oOo-
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant. 
A F F I D A V I T 
Civil No. 84-347 
consolidated with 
Civil NO. 84-348 
(Judge Rigtrup) 
I, Joan H. Elton, being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter. 
2. A divorce trial was conducted between myself and the Defendant on 
or about the 19th day of March, 1985, 
3. A Decree of Divorce, as the final Judgment in that proceeding, was 
signed by the Court and filed with Tooele County Cleric's office on April 16, 
1985. 
4. That as the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter at the time of 
the divorce trial I was pressured by iry attorney into the settlement, I did 
not agree with the context of the settlement and was told by iry attorney that 
he was going to see that it took place in the fashion that the decree 
evidences. 
5. That I wear a hearing aide and cannot hear with out it. 
<^/£ 6. That on the day of the divorce trial I could not hear because my 
hearing aide was not functioning properly and because I had at that time a 
severe ear infection and I told ny attorney, E.H. Fankhauser, of ny problem, 
asked him to seek a continuance and he refused insisting that the proceeding 
go forward anyway. 
7. That irregularities in the proceeding of the Court occurred in that 
the Defendant's counsel, B.L. Dart, had an extended conference with the Judge 
before Plaintiff's counsel arrived at the Court. 
8. That the evidence is not sufficient in any form to support the 
decision as evidenced in the Decree of Divorce dividing the marital estate in 
that with limited particularity the following is asserted: 
A. That the evidence was that the Tri-Plex acquired by the parties 
during the course of the marriage had a fair market value of 
well in excess of $80,000.00, that the evidence clearly 
indicated that the Defendant contributed no more than 
$31,000.00 of monies brought in to the marriage to the 
acquisition of the Tri-Plex and that the Plaintiff was awarded 
oily a $10,000.00 lien against the Tri-Plex therefore granting 
in excess of a $40,000.00 difference and a $30,000.00 windfall 
to the Defendant. 
B. That even if the Tri-Plex was valued at $68,000.00 the 
arithmetical computation would indicate that the Defendant 
still accrued a two to one equity benefit in the distribution 
X \ 
^ \j^ ../• of that marital property. 
\^ 1A \/r 9. That considerable additional marital property was improperly 
valued and that the Defendant accrued substantial excessive distribution per 
the Decree. 
$ ^rL 10. Ihat the Plaintiff through the contribution of timef labor and 
^ \ y monies during the course of this eight year marriage also made substantial 
^ 
A 
contribution to the equity in the properties including the Tri-Plex which 
should have reduced the Defendant's disproportionate original investment to 
zero. 
11. Ihat in essence the Defendant caused the Plaintiff's present 
physical disability to sane degree by virtue of the beatings and physical 
abuse that the Defendant subjected the Plaintiff to during the course of the 
marriage, limiting the Plaintiff's capacity to sustain herself following the 
division of their matrimonial bonds and yet no alimony has been awarded by 
the Court and the Plaintiff asserts that this is a clear abuse of discretion 
entitling the Plaintiff alone under the previsions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(1) to a new trial. 
Further the Affiant saith not. 
DA3ED this 2 5 day of fjp^i Q , 1985. 
SlH. ELTON f^^^ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of Af^ 1985 
N<#ary Publ^/ 
My Ccnntission Expires: 
MAILIN3 CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Affidavit was mailed postage prepaid this ^t> day of ftClAx j) . 
1985, to: 
B.L. Dart 
DART, ADAMSON. PARKEN & PROCTOR 
310 South Main #1330 
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84101 
Secretary JetfL Gc 
B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
v. : Civil No. 84-347 
(Consolidated with 84-34* 




Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternati 
to Amend Judgment entered in this action came on regularly for 
hearing on the 20th day of May, 1985, at the hour of 1:00 p.m., 
plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney William B. 
Parsons III, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorn 
B, L. Dart, and the Court having heard argument from respective 
counsel, and the transcript from the divorce proceeding having I 
offered and received as an exhibit, and the Court having reviewe 
the presentations and being fully advised, 
1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Joan H. Elton's 
Motion for a New Trial and her Motion in the Alternative to Amend 
the Judgment are both denied. 
DATED this day of , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of May, 1985, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to: 
William B. Parsons III 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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